Credentials get scrubbed
Credentials should not be in agent sessions, but sometimes they are. Before anything leaves the machine, the shipper scrubs by pattern everything that looks like one.
Description for security leaders, architects, and engineers. Session data is as valuable as server logs, and as sensitive, so it gets the same handling: scrubbed, encrypted, uploaded to your bucket, normalized. The deployment modes show which parts you can run yourself.
Start storing how agents behave before 30-day retention or a wiped device loses it. No analysis with Quesma components. Quesma holds no key.
The archive plus open-source normalization: one format across harnesses and versions, analyzed with your own tools. Quesma holds no key.
Easiest to use and manage. Quesma hosts everything, the control plane and the bucket included, and needs your private key to decrypt the sessions.
You own your data and can inspect it before Quesma processes it. Control plane and bucket run in your cloud. Quesma needs your private key to decrypt the sessions and build the tables.
Everything runs in your environment: AWS, Snowflake, Databricks, and alike. Quesma holds no key. For $2M+ a year of agentic coding spend.
~/.claude/projects ~/.codex/sessions ~/.cursor/projects plus metadata: git remotes, account plan and rate-limit tier.ghp_d23243224q… becomes __REDACTED:github-pat__. Always on: no configuration layer can switch it off.Never receives session, can't decrypt the data
v1/organization=<org>/install=<uuid>/mirror/source=<source>/<64 hex>.age
6Normalizeto one format
across versions
and harnesses
7Analyze
Credentials should not be in agent sessions, but sometimes they are. Before anything leaves the machine, the shipper scrubs by pattern everything that looks like one.
Cloud permissions on the bucket, and a per-customer encryption key. The keys are public-private: a writer holds only the public key and cannot decrypt what it wrote. An accidentally shared object does not leak session content.
Everything that runs on your devices is open source under Apache 2.0. You are welcome to verify it or contribute.
It never sees session content and holds no key. It cannot widen what the shipper reads: the scope is compiled into the binary, and a new root needs a release. It cannot remove a reader, a scrub rule, or encryption; a configuration it cannot honor is refused whole, and a local disable beats a remote enable. Quesma staff do not open your sessions; humans get access only on your ticket.
It reads the agents' own session directories and nothing else: no other files, no keystrokes, no screenshots, no browser history, no process list. Credential stores such as ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, and .env files sit on a compiled deny list. Sessions like these are what improves agents; public datasets such as SWE-chat on Hugging Face are made of them. Quesma works on the raw sessions, but the product shows aggregates by team, repository, and kind of work, not individual prompts. quesma-shipper preview shows what the next run would send.
| Deployment mode | Control plane | Bucket | Tables and analytics | Private key | You deploy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Open-source archive | Your environment | Your bucket | None | Yours only | Shipper, control plane, bucket |
| Open-source normalization | Your environment | Your bucket | Your tables, your tools | Yours only | Shipper, control plane, bucket, normalizer |
| Professional | Hosted by Quesma | Hosted by Quesma | Hosted by Quesma | Yours, shared with Quesma to decrypt | Shipper |
| Business / Enterprise SaaS | Your cloud | Your bucket | Hosted by Quesma | Yours, shared with Quesma to decrypt | Shipper, control plane, bucket |
| Enterprise BYOC$2M+ a year of agentic coding spend | Your cloud | Your bucket | Your cloud | Yours only | Everything, with Quesma software in your cloud |
Quesma aims to support the major clouds (AWS, GCP, Azure, Cloudflare) and data platforms (Snowflake, Databricks).